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TOO BIG TO OBEY: WHY BP SHOULD BE DEBARRED
RENA STEINZOR & ANNE HAVEMANN*
INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and BP are slowly emerging
from the aftermath of the biggest environmental disaster in American
history: an eighty-seven-day, slow-motion, underwater spill that depos-
ited an estimated 205 million gallons of crude oil into fragile ecosystems.1
The spectacle of the damage caused by the huge spill and the company’s
increasingly desperate efforts to control it were alarming enough. As in-
vestigative reporters converged on the scene, an equally disconcerting
history of corporate scofflaw on a national scale soon emerged.
An explosion killed fifteen and injured 180 at the company’s Texas
City refinery in July 2005.2 The tragedy was preceded by ample warnings
that maintenance, training, and front-line risk management at the plant
were alarmingly deficient.3 That same month, BP’s $5 billion dollar pro-
duction platform, which was nicknamed “Thunder Horse,” tipped at a
sharp angle toward the sea because a valve was installed backwards.4 A
few months later, a 200,000 gallon oil spill—the biggest ever on Alaska’s
North Slope—was preceded by whistle blower reports that inspections
and maintenance were erratic to the point of willful negligence.5 The
* Rena Steinzor is a professor, and Anne Havemann is a second-year student, at the
University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Steinzor is also the president of the Center
for Progressive Reform, http://www.progressivereform.org.
1 See Maureen Hoch, New Estimate Puts Gulf Oil Leak at 205 Million Gallons, PBS
NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN NEWS BLOG (Aug. 2, 2010, 10:07 PM), http://www.pbs.org
/newshour/rundown/2010/08/new-estimate-puts-oil-leak-at-49-million-barrels.html.
2 For an in-depth report on the tragedy and what caused it, see U.S. CHEM. SAFETY &
HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT NO. 2005-04-ITX, INVESTIGATION REPORT: REFINERY
EXPLOSION AND FIRE (15 KILLED, 180 INJURED) 17 (2007), available at http://www.csb.gov
/assets/document/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf.
3 See TELOS GRP., BP TEXAS CITY SITE REPORT OF FINDINGS: TEXAS CITY’S PROTECTION
PERFORMANCE, BEHAVIORS, CULTURE, MANAGEMENT, AND LEADERSHIP (2005), available
at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5170/the-telos-report.pdf (unpublished con-
fidential report).
4 See Sarah Lyall et al., In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-environment
/13bprisk.html?pagewanted=print.
5 See Abrahm Lustgarten, Furious Growth and Cost Cuts Led to BP Accidents Past &
Present, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/bp-accidents-past
-and-present.
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company settled criminal charges with the government but its performance
was so poor in subsequent years that the government moved to revoke its
probation.6 Regarded as a rogue even by its oil industry compatriots,7 BP
was a company moving too fast to be bothered with what experts call a
“safety culture” in any of its dangerous operations.8 For years, it skipped
past civil and criminal penalties, inflicting collateral damage on thousands
of bystanders.
Lesson learned, crackdown coming? Hardly. To this day, BP re-
mains the Pentagon’s largest supplier of jet and vehicle fuel, with govern-
ment contracts valued at more than $2.2 billion.9 Any suggestion that the
company could be debarred by the government’s biggest spender is sum-
marily dismissed by expert observers, with Pentagon sources allegedly
asserting that debarring BP would jeopardize fuel supplies needed by
combat units in the Middle East.10
6 See Jason Leopold, BP Still Being Awarded Lucrative Government Contracts, TRUTHOUT
(Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.truth-out.org/bp-still-being-awarded-lucrative-government
-contracts.
7 The world’s largest oil companies have taken the position that BP is, in essence, a rogue
company that mishandled the drilling of the Macondo well that was the source of the
disaster. John M. Broder, Oil Executives Break Ranks in Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2010, at A20 (“The chairmen of four of the world’s largest oil companies broke their nearly
two-month silence on the major spill in the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday and publicly blamed
BP for mishandling the well that caused the disaster. Seeking to insulate their companies
from the continuing crisis in the gulf and the political backlash in Washington, the leaders
of Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Shell and ConocoPhillips insisted at a Congressional hearing
that they would not have made the mistakes that led to the well explosion and the deaths
of 11 rig workers on April 20.”). The special commission appointed by President Obama to
investigate the spill disagreed with their diagnosis. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE
FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 122 (2011) [hereinafter GULF OIL SPILL COMMISSION
REPORT] (“The blowout was not the product of . . . aberrational decisions made by rogue
industry or government officials. . . . [T]he root causes are systemic and, absent signif-
icant reform . . ., might well recur. The missteps were rooted in systemic failures by in-
dustry management (extending beyond BP to contractors that serve many in the industry),
and also by failures of government to provide effective regulatory oversight.”).
8 See generally ANDREW HOPKINS, SAFETY, CULTURE, AND RISK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSES
OF DISASTERS (2005) (discussing how it is the failure of companies and organizations, not
individuals, and their view of safety management that causes major disasters in mines,
chemical plants, etc.).
9 Ben Rooney, BP Still a Top Supplier to U.S. Military, CNN MONEY (July 15, 2010, 11:25
AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2010/07/15/news/companies/BP_government_contracts
/index.htm.
10 See R. Jeffrey Smith, BP Still Does Big Federal Business, WASH. POST, July 5, 2010, at
A1, A3 (however, the Department of Defense officially says “that there are adequate pro-
cedures and processes to protect the U.S. military missions should EPA determine that BP
should be debarred.”).
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In theory at least, the U.S. government does business only with
firms considered “responsible” under the law.11 Chronic malfeasance should
trigger debarment and some statutes, including the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts, provide for immediate suspension for government contractors.12
Debarment, referred to as the “nuclear option” by pundits,13 is ex-
plicitly limited in purpose to the protection of the public interest and can-
not be used to “punish” contractors.14 Perhaps because of this perplexing
rule, debarment does not seem to worry the Fortune 500 corporations that
dominate Department of Defense (“DOD”) purchase orders. Studies by the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the Project on Government
Oversight (“POGO”), a Washington-based public interest group, have doc-
umented the unfortunate truth that small contractors are much more like-
ly to be suspended or debarred than large ones, no matter how egregious
the latter’s behavior, rendering the process a pale carbon copy of what
Congress intended it to be.15
In the context of BP, this Article asks whether the nation can tol-
erate the emerging reality that some firms are too big to suffer this pow-
erful consequence of breaking the law, even if violations occur multiple
times, with appalling consequences. If ever a company deserved to be
debarred, it is BP. Conversely, if BP avoids government-wide debarment,
the inescapable message will be that the U.S. government is not serious
about this remedy and is willing to do business with any large corporation,
no matter how irresponsible it may be. Over the last two decades, Fortune
500 companies with disgraceful track records have continued to do busi-
ness with the government, avoiding debarment without taking effective
11 Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a) (2010) (“Agencies shall
solicit offers from, award contracts to, and consent to subcontracts with responsible
contractors only.”).
12 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006).
13 See Larry Kudlow, Will Obama Go Nuclear on BP Tonight?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 15,
2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/kudlows-money-politics/204230/will-obama
-go-nuclear-bp-tonight.
14 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) (2010).
15 See, e.g., Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment
System, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, at “Uneven Playing Field” (May 10, 2002), http://
www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contract-oversight/federal-contractor-misconduct/co
-fcm-20020510.html; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-374, FEDERAL
CONTRACTORS: BETTER PERFORMANCE INFORMATION NEEDED TO SUPPORT AGENCY CONTRACT
AWARD DECISIONS 6, 8–10 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09374.pdf
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE INFORMATION REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-479, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT: ADDITIONAL DATA REPORTING COULD IMPROVE THE
SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT PROCESS 12–14 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d05479.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT].
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action to remedy violations.16 The root of this problem is DOD, which
spends more money on contractors than any other agency or department
and consequently holds the whip hand on government-wide debarment.17
The threat of debarment conceivably is used behind-the-scenes as a threat
to provoke settlement on less drastic terms. Given the confidentiality sur-
rounding the settlement of government enforcement actions, we cannot
know. But without routine, public enforcement of this powerful tool, that
threat is likely to have lost its potency long ago.
Part I reviews the legal elements of debarment and suspension.
Part II applies these provisions to what we know of the BP saga. Part III
examines the problems that plague the system as a whole and proposes
solutions that would strengthen debarment and suspension substance and
procedure, returning it to its rightful place as a major factor in deterring
lawbreaking by federal contractors.
I. DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION LAW
A. Overview
Debarment and suspension (commonly referred to as “exclusion”)
are available to all government agencies to ensure that they only enter into
financial relationships with “responsible” contractors.18 Suspension often
precedes debarment and generally removes an entity’s eligibility for federal
contracts for the duration of an investigation or litigation.19 Debarment,
which occurs after an entity is found liable of an offense covered by a stat-
utory debarment provision or an agency determines that the contractor
is not presently responsible,20 removes the entity’s eligibility for a fixed
period of time, generally no longer than three years.21
16 See Federal Contractor Misconduct, supra note 15, at “Repeat Offenders.” General
Electric, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Fluor are all Fortune 500 companies.
See Fortune 500—Our Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations, FORTUNE
ON CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/full_list
/index.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
17 See Summaries—Prime Award Spending Data By Agency, USAspending.gov, http://
www.usaspending.gov/explore?carryfilters=on (Select only “contracts” as spending type to
view) (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
18 See 2 C.F.R. § 180.125(a) (2011); 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a) (2010).
19 See 2 C.F.R. § 180.605 (2011); 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-3 (2010).
20 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2010); Burke v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235,
239 (D.D.C. 2001).
21 See 2 C.F.R. § 180.865 (2011); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4 (2010).
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Agencies have the authority to exclude entities when they have
violated specific statutes or when they have breached administrative rules
governing federal procurement and assistance programs. Statutes such
as the Clean Air (“CAA”) and Clean Water (“CWA”) Acts trigger automatic
disqualification for contractors who are found to have engaged in prohib-
ited conduct.22 In addition to these statutory debarments, federal agencies
may exclude entities from contracting with or receiving assistance from
the federal government pursuant to administrative rules. Government
procurement is regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”)
Subpart 9.4.23 Non-procurement spending, such as grants, loans, and other
federal assistance programs, is regulated in accordance with administra-
tive guidance promulgated by the Office of Management and Budget.24
This Article focuses solely on the first category: exclusion of companies
hired by the federal government to accomplish a task or perform a service.
Most exclusions apply government-wide.25 Excluded contractors
and participants in federal assistance programs are listed in the Excluded
Parties List System (“EPLS”).26 Agencies may only contract with excluded
contractors by granting them a waiver27 or entering into an administra-
tive agreement that requires them to remedy the underlying practices
that make debarment appropriate.28
The fundamental paradox of debarment is that agencies cannot
exclude a contractor “for purposes of punishment” and instead must find
the action necessary to protect the “public interest.”29 Because debarment
is regarded as the ultimate punishment by everyone involved in the system,
22 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006).
23 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.400 (2010).
24 See 2 C.F.R. § 180.500 (2010).
25 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(c) (2010) (debarment); 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-1(d) (2010) (suspension).
26 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.404(b) (2010).
27 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(c) (debarment); 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-1(d) (suspension).
28 While the FAR does not explicitly authorize such agreements, they fall within agencies’
general authority to determine with whom and on what terms they contract. 48 C.F.R.
§ 1.601(a) (2010) (“Unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law, authority
and responsibility to contract . . . are vested in the agency head.”).
29 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) (2010) (“The serious nature of debarment and suspension requires
that these sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s pro-
tection and not for purposes of punishment.”). Mandatory statutory debarments do not
contain similar public interest requirements. See 2 C.F.R § 1532.1120 (2011) (“[T]he pur-
pose of CAA and CWA disqualification is to enforce the Federal Government’s policy of
undertaking Federal procurement and nonprocurement activities in a manner that im-
proves and enhances environmental quality by promoting effective enforcement of the
CAA or CWA.”).
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the line between the two conditions provides ample excuse to avoid an af-
firmative finding against the contractor. To compound this confusion, the
FAR does not define the term “public interest.” Instead, two additional find-
ings must support a debarment decision: (1) whether a cause for debarment
exists under the FAR30 and (2) whether the contractor is able to demon-
strate that it has the present capacity to be responsible.31 “Responsible” con-
tractors must have a “satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.”32
Because the purpose of exclusion is to ensure that the government
only transacts with responsible parties,33 past transgressions may not be
enough to demonstrate a lack of “present” responsibility.34 Determinations
of the public interest are two-dimensional and must encompass the safe-
guarding of public funds by excluding parties who are not responsible,
while at the same time allowing contractors who are presently respon-
sible to compete.35 Debarment officials must also consider the seriousness
and nature of past or present violations, including the possibility of
30 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2(a) to (c) (2010).
31 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a) (2010) (“[T]he contractor has the burden of demonstrating . . .
its present responsibility and that debarment is not necessary.”).
32 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1 (2010). As an example of how to determine when a contractor demon-
strates a satisfactory record, the circular FAR directs contracting officers to section 42.1501,
which instructs them to consider, among other things, “the contractor’s record of integ-
rity and business ethics.” 48 C.F.R. § 42.1501 (2010). A “contractor responsibility” rule,
which the Clinton administration proposed in July 1999, clarified that one element of a
“[s]atisfactory record of integrity and business ethics” is compliance with the law. Federal
Acquisition Regulation; Contractor Responsibility, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,359, 37,360 (proposed
July 9, 1999). The rule was adopted in 2000. See Federal Acquisition Regulation; Contractor
Responsibility, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,255, 80,256 (Dec. 20, 2000). Shortly after coming into
office, President Bush revoked the clarifying rule. See Federal Acquisition Regulation;
Contractor Responsibility, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,758 (proposed Apr. 3, 2001). As a result, the
responsibility determination is not the thorough pre-screening exercise it was intended
to be. See David Madland & Karla Walter, Rein in Irresponsible Oil Drillers, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (June 3, 2010), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2010/06/bp
_contracts.html.
33 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a) (2010).
34 See Burke v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The
initiation of a debarment proceeding requires the existence of past misconduct; however,
the final decision to debar an individual must focus on that individual’s present business
responsibility.”); see also Shane Meat Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 800 F.2d 334, 338 (3d Cir.
1986) (“A criminal sentence constitutes punishment for past wrongdoing. In contrast, a
debarment is designed to insure the integrity of government contracts in the immediate
present and into the future.”).
35 See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (“Disqualification from
bidding or contracting . . . directs the power and prestige of the government at a particular
person and . . . may have a serious economic impact on that person.”).
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underlying intention, the contractor’s remedial efforts, and the effect of
such efforts.36
B. Five Elements
Five elements comprise procurement exclusions: (1) whether
exclusion is mandatory or discretionary; (2) the grounds for exclusion;
(3) the consequences of exclusion; (4) the availability of waivers to pre-
vent exclusion; and (5) the duration of the exclusion.
1. Mandatory Versus Discretionary
Twelve federal statutes and one executive order include provisions
specifying that parties who engage in certain conduct shall or may be
excluded from future dealings with the federal government.37 Although
executive orders are not statutes, the terms “statutory debarment” and
“statutory suspension” are used to refer to exclusions that result from such
orders in order to distinguish them from exclusions authorized by admin-
istrative rules.38 Persons identified by statute—often the head of an agency
or department—make the debarment and suspension determination.39 Of
36 See Fed. Food Serv., Inc. v. Donovan, 658 F.2d 830, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that
agencies must consider the seriousness of the contractor’s past transgression(s) and whether
the contractor acted willfully); Robinson v. Cheney, 876 F.2d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
contractor can meet the test of present responsibility by demonstrating that it has taken
steps to ensure that the wrongful acts will not recur.”). The regulations require debarring
and suspending officials to consider certain mitigating factors. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-
1(a)(1) to (10) (2010). Examples of mitigating factors include (1) whether the contractor
brought the activity cited as a cause for debarment to the attention of the government in
a timely manner; (2) whether the contractor instituted new procedures and training
programs; and (3) whether the contractor has taken other remedial measures. See id.
37 The twelve statutory provisions that discuss debarment are: (1) Buy American Act, 41
U.S.C.A. § 8303 (2011); (2) Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006); (3) Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1368 (2006); (4) Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 31449(b) (2002); (5) Drug-Free
Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006); (6) Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R.
167, 174 (1964–1965), as amended; (7) Military Recruiting on Campus, 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)
(2006); 48 C.F.R. § 209.470-2 (2010); (8) Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 354(a) (2006);
(9) Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006); (10) Sudan Accountability and Divestment
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516, 2521 (2007); (11) 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2006); and (12)
10 U.S.C. § 2408(a) (2006).
38 See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34753, DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION
OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW INCLUDING RECENTLY ENACTED
AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 2 (2011).
39 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006) (EPA Administrator to debar contractors
for certain violations of the Clean Air Act).
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the twelve statutes and executive orders that provide for exclusion, nine
provide for mandatory exclusion, including the CAA and CWA,40 and three
leave the decision up to the discretion of the designated official.41
Statutory exclusions usually require that the excluded party be
convicted of wrongdoing, but a few authorize designated officials to issue
administrative findings triggering the sanction.42 For example, the manda-
tory exclusion provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act kick
in automatically only after a conviction or a guilty plea.43 In contrast, the
Walsh-Healey Act, which governs workplace conditions and wages, grants
the agency head, in this case the Secretary of Labor, the authority to
make an administrative finding that persons or firms violated workplace-
standard laws.44
In addition to statutory exclusions, agencies and departments may
also exclude contractors under the Federal Acquisition Regulations, which
provide authority for agencies or departments to debar and suspend con-
tractors from future executive branch contracts.45 Exclusion is carried out
either by the agency head or a designee authorized by the agency head.46
Unlike most statutory debarments, FAR debarments and suspension are
discretionary.47
40 The nine statutory provisions that mandate debarment are: (1) Buy American Act, 41
U.S.C.A. § 8303 (2011); (2) Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006); (3) Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006); (4) Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (2002); (5) Drug-Free
Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701 (2006); (6) Military Recruiting on Campus, 10
U.S.C. § 983 (2006); 48 C.F.R. § 209.470 (2010); (7) Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 354
(2006); (8) Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006); and (9) 10 U.S.C. § 2408 (2006).
41 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 167, 174 (1964–1965), as amended (concerning equal
employment opportunity and affirmative action requirements); Sudan Accountability and
Divestment Act, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat 2516, 2521 (2007); and 21 U.S.C. § 862
(2006) (regulating the distribution of controlled substances).
42 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1) (2006) (debarment based on conviction), with 41 U.S.C.
§ 10b(b) (debarment based on agency head’s findings).
43 Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, “[n]o Federal agency may enter into any contract with
any person, who has been convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this title . . . .”
Clean Water Act § 1368(a). Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, “[n]o Federal agency may enter
into any contract with any person who is convicted of any offense under section 7413(c)
of this title . . . .” Clean Air Act § 7606(a) (2006). The offenses triggering automatic ex-
clusion can be found at Clean Water Act § 1319(c) (2006) and Clean Air Act § 7413(c).
44 See 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006). Pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, the Secretary of Labor
may find—and thus exclude—a person or firm that has maintained hazardous working
conditions, failed to pay minimum wage, used child labor, or required mandatory and
uncompensated overtime. 41 U.S.C. § 35 (2006).
45 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.400 (2010).
46 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.403.
47 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a) (“Debarment and suspension are discretionary actions.”).
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2. Grounds
Grounds for statutory exclusions are delineated by each individual
statute.48 Under the CWA, the offenses triggering automatic exclusion
include an unpermitted discharge of any pollutant into the waters of the
United States; a discharge of any pollutant into a publicly owned treatment
works in violation of a pre-treatment standard; or the introduction into
a public owned treatment works of a pollutant or hazardous substance
with knowledge that the substance could cause personal injury or prop-
erty damage.49 Prohibited acts under the CAA include violating new source
performance standards, violating any requirements of state implementation
plans, violating emission standards for various new and old sources, and
releasing designated hazardous air pollutants in disregard of emissions
standards.50 Pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, the Secretary of Labor may
find—and thus exclude—a person or firm that has maintained hazardous
working conditions, failed to pay minimum wage, used child labor, or re-
quired mandatory and uncompensated overtime.51
Under the FAR, debarment may be imposed when a contractor is
convicted of or found civilly liable for an integrity offense.52 Adequate evi-
dence of an “integrity offense”—an indictment, for example—may result
in suspension.53 Debarment may also be imposed when government officials
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the contractor committed
certain offenses, such as serious violations of the terms of a government
contract, unfair trade practices, or failure to pay federal taxes.54 Finally, the
“catch-all” provision of the FAR allows debarment and suspension “based
on any other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the
present responsibility of the contractor or subcontractor.”55 Where grounds
for debarment or suspension exist, the designated debarment official at any
48 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 1368(a) (“No Federal agency may enter into any contract with
any person, who has been convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this title . . . .”).
49 See Clean Water Act §§ 1319(c)(1) to (2). Violations occur when the actor acts negligently
or knowingly. See id.
50 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2006). An actor must act knowingly for a vio-
lation to occur. See id.
51 See Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (2006).
52 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (2010) for a full list of integrity offenses. They include acts
such as “embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, mak-
ing false statements, tax evasion, violating Federal criminal tax laws, or receiving stolen
property.” 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a)(3).
53 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.407-2(a) to (b).
54 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2(b)(1) to (2) for a full list of qualifying offenses.
55 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(c) (debarment); 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-2(c) (suspension).
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agency or department may act to exclude the contractor, although such pro-
ceedings are typically initiated by the government entity that wrote the
initial contract.56 This provision means, however, that the EPA has the
authority to initiate debarment or suspension with respect to BP’s contracts
with the Pentagon.57
Conduct by a contractor’s officers, directors, shareholders, partners,
employees, or other associates that warrants debarment or suspension
can be imputed to the contractor, and vice versa when the conduct oc-
curred in connection with the individual’s performance of duties for or on
behalf of the contractor, or with the contractor’s knowledge, approval, or
acquiescence.58
3. Consequences
While statutory exclusions generally apply government-wide, some
limit the scope of the exclusion to only certain types of contractors or inter-
actions with specified agencies.59 Others limit the exclusion to the facility
that gave rise to the conviction. So, for example, under the CWA and CAA,
only the facility at which the violation occurred is excluded from contract-
ing with the federal government.60 Exclusion under the Walsh-Healey
Act, on the other hand, is not limited to the facility at which the violation
occurred.61 A suspension or debarment under the FAR is effective through-
out the executive branch and applies to all divisions or other organiza-
tional elements of an entity unless otherwise specified.62
Once excluded, a company is listed in the EPLS or its statutory
equivalent.63 EPLS is overseen by the General Services Administration
56 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(d) (2010) (describing the procedures when more than one agency
has an interest in the debarment or suspension of a contractor).
57 See, e.g., EPA Lifts Temporary Suspension of IBM for Misconduct on Agency Contract
Bid, 89 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at 371 (Apr. 8, 2008) (EPA suspended IBM because
of its alleged misconduct when bidding on an EPA contract. At the time, IBM had con-
tracts with numerous other federal agencies.).
58 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-5(a) to (c) (2010).
59 See, e.g., Military Recruiting on Campus, 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2004) (debarment for insti-
tutions of higher learning only); 48 C.F.R. § 209.470 (2010) (same); 10 U.S.C. § 2408
(2006) (debarment from Department of Defense contracts only).
60 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (2006).
However, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act gave the Administrator discretion
to extend the ban on contracts to other facilities owned or operated by the convicted
person. See Clean Air Act § 7606(a).
61 See Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006).
62 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-1(b) to (c) (2010).
63 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.404(c) (2010).
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(“GSA”) and in theory contains the names and addresses of all contractors
and persons that have been suspended, debarred, proposed to be debarred,
or otherwise declared ineligible.64 Because all excluded entities, no matter
whether they are contractors or persons receiving federal assistance, are
entered into EPLS, an entity excluded from contracting with the federal
government will also be excluded from receiving assistance from the
federal government, and vice versa.65 In addition to EPLS, statutes that
provide for exclusion generally direct an agency to maintain and distrib-
ute its own list of excluded parties.66 For example, once a company or
individual is convicted or settles a case under the CWA and CAA, the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) must immediately list the
offending facility or individual.67 Under the Walsh-Healey Act, once the
Secretary of Labor finds that an entity has violated certain workplace
standards, the Comptroller General is directed to distribute a list of the
violators to all federal agencies.68
4. Waivers and Administrative Agreements
Because an excluded party is generally barred from contracting
with the entire executive branch of the federal government, an agency
may continue to do business with that party only if it determines that
“compelling reasons” require granting it an exception (commonly known as
64 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.404(a) to (b); discussion infra Part III.C; see also INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. D-2011-083, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS CAN FURTHER IMPROVE THE
DOD SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT PROCESS 19 (2011) (explaining that contracting officers
occasionally receive no results from EPLS searches because of “typographical and user
input errors”); see also FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining
that incomplete or unreliable EPLS data make it difficult to identify excluded parties).
65 See 2 C.F.R. § 180.140 (2010); 2 C.F.R. § 180.145 (2010).
66 See, e.g., Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006) (“The Comptroller General is authorized
and directed to distribute a list . . . containing the names of persons or firms found . . . to
have breached any of the agreements or representations required . . . .”).
67 Until 1996, EPA administered the listing and debarment programs separately, main-
taining a separate “List of Violating Facilities” for facilities and individuals barred from
doing business with the federal government because of CAA and CWA convictions. DAVID
R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE
§ 11.18 (20th ed. 2010). Since then, EPA has merged the two and now incorporates its List
of Violating Facilities into the EPLS. Suspension and Debarment Program, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/debarment.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). An
explanation of how EPA administers the “listing” provisions in both Acts can be found at
2 C.F.R. § 1532.1100 (2010).
68 See Walsh-Healey Act § 37.
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a waiver)69 or by entering into an administrative agreement.70 Most statu-
tory debarment provisions allow for waivers, which vary in stringency.71
Under the CWA and the CAA, for instance, only the President can waive
an exclusion if he or she determines it is in the country’s paramount inter-
est and notifies Congress.72 In contrast, the Walsh-Healey Act describes
the Secretary of Labor’s authority to grant waivers as a duty “when justice
or the public interest will be served.”73
The FAR allows an agency head to grant a waiver for a “compelling
reason” but does not define the term.74 Several agency-specific regulations
list examples, including national defense;75 “urgency” requiring award to
the debarred firm;76 availability of only one capable contractor;77 or cir-
cumstances where “failure to contract with the debarred or suspended
contractor would seriously harm the agency’s programs and prevent ac-
complishment of mission requirements.”78
69 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(c) (2010) (“A contractor’s debarment, or proposed debarment,
shall be effective throughout the executive branch of the Government, unless the agency
head or a designee . . . states in writing the compelling reasons justifying continued busi-
ness dealings between that agency and the contractor.”); 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-1(d) (2010) (same
for suspension).
70 Administrative agreements fall within agencies’ general authority to determine with
whom and on what terms they contract. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.601(a) (2010) (“Unless specifi-
cally prohibited by another provision of law, authority and responsibility to contract . . . are
vested in the agency head.”).
71 Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368(d) (2006) (allowing the President to waive
a debarment “in the paramount interests of the United States” with notice to Congress),
with Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (2011) (making no provisions for waiver).
72 See Clean Water Act § 1368(d); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606(d) (2006).
73 41 U.S.C. § 6508(a) (2011).
74 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.405-1(b), 9.405-2(a), 9.406-1(c), 9.407-1(d) (2010).
75 See Dep’t of Def. Fed. Acquisition Reg. Supplement (“DFARS”), 48 C.F.R. § 209.405(a)(iv)
(2010) (“The national defense requires continued business dealings with the debarred or
suspended contractor.”).
76 See 48 C.F.R. § 209.405(a)(ii) (“Urgency requires contracting with a debarred or sus-
pended contractor.”); Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Acquisition Reg. (“HHSAR”), 48
C.F.R. § 309.405(a)(1)(ii) (2010) (“The urgency of the requirement dictates that HHS
conduct business with the cited contractor.”).
77 See 48 C.F.R. § 309.405(a)(1)(I) (2010).
78 Dep’t of Agric. Acquisition Reg. (“AGAR”), 48 C.F.R. § 409.405 (2010); Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n Acquisition Reg. (“NRCAR”), 48 C.F.R. § 2009.405 (2010). The Department of
Energy further narrows the compelling reason exception by allowing the agency to dis-
approve of a debarred firm’s choice of key federal personnel, for example, the contractor’s
choice regarding who at the federal agency will serve as principal investigator. See 48
C.F.R. § 909.405 (2010).
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In addition to waivers, parties can avoid exclusion by participating
in administrative agreements.79 These agreements usually include an ad-
mission by the offending party regarding its wrongful conduct and provide
for remedial measures, such as restitution, employee training, or other
remedial measures.80 The agency “reserves the right to impose additional
sanctions, including debarment, if the contractor fails to abide by [its]
agreement or engages in further misconduct.”81 The FAR does not explicitly
authorize such agreements, but they fall within agencies’ general authority
to determine with whom and on what terms they contract.82 Administrative
agreements are recorded in the Federal Awardee Performance Integrity
Information System (“FAPIIS”).83
5. Length of Exclusion
For statutory exclusions, the disqualification generally lasts until
a designated official finds that the contractor has ceased the conduct that
constituted its violation of the statute.84 Under the CWA and CAA, for
instance, the facility or individual remains disqualified until the EPA
Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to the conviction
has been corrected.85 Pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, exclusion lasts
for three years, unless the Secretary recommends otherwise.86 According
to the FAR, debarments last for a period “commensurate with the seri-
ousness of the cause,” generally not exceeding three years.87 Suspension
79 See Memorandum from Paul A. Denett, Adm’r for Fed. Procurement Pol’y, & Linda M.
Combs, Controller, Office of Fed. Fin. Mgmt. on Suspension and Debarment,
Administrative Agreements, and Compelling Reason Determinations, to the Heads of
Departments and Agencies (Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/omb/assets/omb/memoranda/fy2006/m06-26.pdf (“Agencies sometimes enter
into administrative agreements with contractors and grant recipients as an alternative to
suspension or debarment from doing business with the Federal government.”).
80 See MANUEL, supra note 38, at 9.
81 Id.
82 See 48 C.F.R. § 1.601(a) (2010) (“Unless specifically prohibited by another provision of
law, authority and responsibility to contract . . . are vested in the agency head.”).
83 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 41 U.S.C. § 2313
(2011); FED. AWARDEE PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY INFO. SYS., http://www.fapiis.gov (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
84 Compare Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3) (2006) (providing for
debarment for up to five years), with Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006)
(suspensions for certain violations of the Clean Water Act end when an official “certifies
. . . condition giving rise to such conviction has been corrected”).
85 See Clean Water Act § 1368(a) (2006); Clean Air Act § 7606(a) (2006).
86 See Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006).
87 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(a)(1) (2010). The FAR allows debarring officials to extend the
debarment for an additional period if they determine that an extension is necessary to
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lasts only as long as an agency’s investigation of the conduct for which
the contractor was suspended, or any ensuing legal proceedings, but gen-
erally may not exceed eighteen months.88
6. Grounds for Appeal
To successfully appeal exclusions, contractors must either satisfy
the rigorous “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)89 or demonstrate that the proce-
dures followed denied them constitutional due process.90 APA judicial
review provisions require a court to set aside agency actions that are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law.”91 A court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for
the agency’s judgment.92 Thus, when cause for suspension or debarment
exists, courts should defer to the agency’s decision on whether to impose
the sanction and the severity of the sanction.93 Courts should consider
whether the agency examined the case facts and articulated a satisfac-
tory explanation for its decision, including a “rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.”94
Courts will reverse sanctions that do not bear a rational relation-
ship to the facts found,95 or where the government has failed to consider
all of the relevant factors in imposing the sanction.96 Courts are particu-
larly inclined to find that an agency’s exclusion determination violates
protect the government’s interests. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(b). However, an extension
cannot be based solely upon the facts and circumstances upon which the initial debar-
ment was based. See id.
88 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-4 (2010).
89 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91 Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A) (2006).
92 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
93 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (explaining
that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to considerable deference).
94 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
95 See, e.g., Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399–401 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the facts
did not support the debarring official’s decision to debar two officers, on the basis that
they had reason to know of the corporation’s criminal conduct, but not the treasurer of
the corporation who also had reason to know of the conduct).
96 See, e.g., Shane Meat Co. v. Dep’t. of Def., 800 F.2d 334, 337 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that
because the debarring official took the necessary mitigating factors into account, the de-
barment was not arbitrary and capricious).
2011] TOO BIG TO OBEY 95
the APA if the agency had previously awarded contracts to the contractor,
despite being aware of the circumstances that ultimately caused it to ex-
clude that same contractor.97
In addition to challenges under the APA, a contractor or partici-
pant that was excluded under a discretionary provision can challenge an
agency’s decision on constitutional due-process grounds.98 Pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”99 Courts have found that parties do not have a right to do business
with the government and thus have no constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest.100 However, they have also said that contractors have a
“liberty interest” in continuing to do business with the government
except for just cause.101
Through various decisions, courts have determined that contrac-
tors and participants cannot be excluded without certain procedural
safeguards.102 Parties must receive notice, which must be sufficiently
specific to enable the party to collect and present relevant evidence on his
or her behalf.103 In exceptional circumstances, a party may be suspended
temporarily pending an investigation without providing notice and a
97 See, e.g., Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 238, 247–48 (2001) (holding
that an agency had acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it suspended a contractor
based on circumstances that the agency had been aware of when it awarded it five
separate contracts).
98 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Old Dominion Dairy
Prods., Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also 2 C.F.R. § 1532.1200
(2008) (explaining that a party is “legally on notice by the statutes that a criminal con-
viction [under] the CAA or CWA” triggers automatic disqualification).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100 See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) (government contracting is
a privilege, not a right).
101 See Gonzalez, 334 F.2d at 574 (explaining that the government cannot act arbitrarily
against an entity when debarring it from government contracts); see also Old Dominion
Dairy Prods., 631 F.2d at 962 (noting that it is not entitlement to a government contract
which gives a government contractor standing to challenge its debarment, but rather, its
right to liberty, including the right to contract and to engage in the common occupation
of life). A subsequent decision by the D.C. Circuit held that contractors are also entitled
to due process in suspension determinations. See Horne Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d
1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
102 See Transco Sec., Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 321 (6th Cir. 1981).
103 See, e.g., Horne Bros., 463 F.2d at 1271 (“[F]airness requires that the bidder be given
specific notice. . . .”); Transco Sec., Inc., 639 F.2d at 324 (“[D]ue process . . . required
notice sufficiently specific to enable appellants to marshal evidence in their behalf so as
to make the subsequent opportunity for an administrative hearing a meaningful one.”).
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hearing.104 The period of such a temporary suspension should not exceed
thirty days.105 Once notified, the party then is granted an opportunity to
rebut those charges, and, under some circumstances, a hearing.106
Acknowledging the flexible nature of due process, the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge107 established a balancing test to guide courts
in assessing administrative actions, including debarments.108 The balanc-
ing test requires courts to consider three distinct factors: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erro-
neous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;”
and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”109
Courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine
whether the process afforded the suspended or debarred contractor was
constitutionally sufficient.110 In response to these court decisions, regu-
lations governing debarment today require that the debarring official
notify the contractor or participant of its proposed debarment before it
is debarred.111 Suspension regulations, on the other hand, only require
notice after the suspension has been imposed, so long as the notice is
“immediate.”112 Both debarment and suspension regulations provide that
every party has the right to submit, in person, in writing, or through a rep-
resentative, information and argument in opposition to the exclusion with-
in thirty days of the receipt of notice.113 To determine whether a hearing
104 See Horne Bros., 463 F.2d at 1271.
105 See id. at 1272.
106 See Transco Sec., Inc., 639 F.2d at 321 (“[P]rocedural safeguards includ[e] . . . an
opportunity to rebut th[e] charges, and, under most circumstances, a hearing.”); see also
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (explaining that the opportunity for
hearing must be “appropriate to the nature of the case”) (citation omitted).
107 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
108 See id. at 334–35.
109 Id. at 335.
110 See, e.g., ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 682–84, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that courts must weigh three factors in their due process balancing analysis);
Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]o iden-
tify the specific dictates of due process, three distinct factors must be considered . . . .”).
111 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-3(c) (2010) (“A notice of proposed debarment shall be issued by
the debarring official . . . .”).
112 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-3(c) (2010) (“When a contractor and any specifically named
affiliates are suspended, they shall be immediately advised . . . .”).
113 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-3(c)(4) (2010) (debarment), 9.407-3(c)(5) (2010) (suspension).
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is necessary, courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.114
Exclusion on the basis of a conviction or civil judgment does not require
a fact-finding hearing,115 and when a hearing is granted, it is informal.116
The judicially created doctrine of de facto debarment can also serve
to protect parties from improper exclusion. Adverse agency action that
effectively debars a contractor from government contract work without
the required notice and opportunity to be heard constitutes de facto debar-
ment and violates due process.117 The de facto debarment analysis focuses
mainly on conduct outside the debarment and suspension process that has
the effect of excluding contractors, such as informal blacklisting of specific
firms.118 In addition to constitutional and APA challenges, contractors may
also object to punitive exclusions under the FAR. Because administrative
debarments and suspensions are meant to protect the public interest, not
to punish, courts overturn discretionary debarments that they perceive
to be punitive.119
II. THE EXCLUSION OF BP
A. A Decade of Fiascos
As the Gulf spill became a fixture of the nightly news, investigative
reporters across the country began delving into BP’s environmental and
worker-safety track record in the United States in an effort to understand
the corporate actor at the center of catastrophe on an unprecedented scale.
114 See Transco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1981).
115 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-3(b)(2) (2010) (debarment), 9.407-3(b)(2) (2010) (suspension).
116 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-3(b)(1) (2010), 9.407-3(b)(1) (2010) (directing agencies to es-
tablish procedures governing the debarment and suspension processes that are “as
informal as is practicable, consistent with principles of fundamental fairness.”).
117 See Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 534 F. Supp. 1139, 1153 (D.D.C.
1982), rev’d on other grounds, 714 F.2d 163, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
118 See Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“[W]hen a determination is made that a contractor lacks integrity and the Government
has not acted to invoke formal suspension or disbarment procedures, notice of the charges
must be given to the contractor as soon as possible so that the contractor may utilize
whatever opportunities are available to present its side of the story before adverse action
is taken.”); see also Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 534 F. Supp. at 1153 (“Defendants cannot
bypass . . . important procedural safeguards merely by omitting the formal label to the
sanction applied.”).
119 See, e.g., IMCO, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (upholding
a debarment but noting that the debarment would have been improper had it been for
the purpose of punishment); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 534 F. Supp. at 1154 (“[T]he court
cannot sustain or permit the denial of a contract if such action is a punishment.”).
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What they discovered is shocking by any metric. While it is tempting to
agree with the oil industry’s claims that BP is a rogue and does not
reflect mainstream industry standards, the ineffectiveness of government
sanctions over a decade of escalating violations does not leave room for
much confidence that bad practices at other companies would be detected,
much less resolved.
In the first of a series of incidents involving serious violations of
the nation’s environmental laws, BP pled guilty to felony charges under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) for illegal dumping
of hazardous waste at its production facilities on Alaska’s North Slope,
paying $22 million in civil penalties and criminal fines.120 The violations
began in 1993.121
Meanwhile, in deference to the company’s size and sophistication,
California regulators decided in 1994 to allow BP the privilege of inspect-
ing its own facilities for compliance with the Clean Air Act, provided that
it submit periodic reports to government officials.122 In 2002, regulators
began to wonder if the records submitted by the company were too good to
be true: the documents showed that storage tanks at its Carson refinery
in Los Angeles had no problems and required no repairs over the entire
period.123 Government inspectors informed the company that they needed
to visit the plant in order to confirm these results, but company execu-
tives took the highly unusual and defiant step of refusing to grant access
voluntarily, forcing regulators to get a search warrant.124 When they fi-
nally entered the plant, the “inspectors discovered that some tanker seals
had tears nearly two feet long,” roofs had pervasive leaks, and these con-
ditions constituted thousands of separate violations of applicable law.125
The case was settled for a civil penalty of $100 million.126
120 See Scott Hiaasen, Any Criminal Charges Likely to be Against BP Rather Than Its
Executives, MCCLATCHEY-TRIB. NEWS. SERV. (June 6, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com
/business/index.ssf/2010/06/any_criminal_charges_likely_to.html. For an official expla-
nation of the case, see BP Exploration, Inc., Multimedia Settlement, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/mm/bpexplor.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2011).
121 See BP exploration, Inc., Multimedia Settlement, supra note 120.
122 See Abraham Lustgarten & Ryan Knutson, Years of Internal BP Probes Warned that
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On September 2, 2004, an accident involving superheated water
killed two workers at BP’s Texas City refinery, triggering soul-searching
at the top levels of the facility’s leadership and a $109,000 civil penalty
to settle a case with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) for seven serious and one “willful” violation.127 (The discrepancy
between EPA and OSHA fines for such egregious misconduct is in and of
itself enormously troubling.)
Alarmed by this and a rash of other accidents, Don Parus, the
plant manager at Texas City and an industry veteran, traveled to London
to beg top BP executives not to cut funding for minimal maintenance and
upgrades of outmoded equipment.128 Parus took the drastic step of pre-
senting a power point containing photographs of dead workers to John
Manzoni, the head of refining and marketing.129 He also commissioned
a consulting firm named Telos to conduct a confidential and anonymous
survey of employees’ concerns about safety and maintenance.130 Telos
reported that “[w]e have never seen a site where the notion ‘I could die
today’ was so real.”131 Despite these extraordinary efforts, London head-
quarters did not respond.132
A mere six months after the superheated water incident, the chill-
ing warnings in the Telos report came true again: a massive explosion
killed fifteen people meeting in a conference room located too close to one
127 See Michael Graczyk, Texas City Sees Its Share of Disasters, KILLEEN DAILY HERALD
(Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.kdhnews.com/news/story.aspx?s=1607; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Cites Houston Refinery $109,500 Following Fatal Texas City Accident
(Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p
_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=11296. The low level of these penalties is shocking given
the severity and consequences of the violations and was the product of both inadequate law
and agency timidity. For an analysis of these problems, see for example, SIDNEY SHAPIRO
ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER NO. 906, REGULATORY DYSFUNCTION:
HOW INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES, OUTDATED LAWS, AND POLITICAL INTERFERENCE CRIPPLE
‘PROTECTOR AGENCIES’ (2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Reg
DysFunction_906.pdf; THOMAS MCGARITY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE
PAPER NO. 1003, WORKERS AT RISK: REGULATORY DYSFUNCTION AT OSHA (2010), available
at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OSHA_1003.pdf.




130 See generally Telos Grp., supra note 3.
131 Lyall et al., supra note 4.
132 See Daniel Schorn, The Explosion at Texas City, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 5:09 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/26/60minutes/main2126509.shtml?tag
=mncol;lst;1.
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of the plant’s most dangerous industrial operations.133 The proximate
cause of the incident was a decision not to invest $150,000 to upgrade
equipment that was considered to be state-of-the-art in the 1950s.134 The
incident was sufficiently serious that BP hired a blue-ribbon commission
headed by former secretary of state James A. Baker III to evaluate what
went wrong.135 The Baker commission’s 2007 report did not equivocate,
attributing the accident to a culture that allowed crucial components of
the physical plant to “run to failure” and penalized workers for express-
ing safety concerns.136 A second report completed by the United States
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board found that the Texas City
disaster was caused by “organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels
of the BP Corporation.”137 When it settled the last of 1300 lawsuits arising
from the incident, BP apologized and pledged through its lawyer that it
was “working hard to see that nothing like this ever happens again.”138
The company may have been working, but not terribly hard. In
the aftermath of Texas City, OSHA imposed $21 million in civil penalties
on the company, the largest in the agency’s history, and placed the plant
on a demanding schedule to rectify safety hazards.139 Years later, a com-
pliance check revealed that BP had ignored these requirements and missed
the deadlines in its consent decree; this time, OSHA imposed a fine of $50
million.140 BP also pled guilty to a felony violation of the Clean Air Act
and paid a $50 million fine in a case referred to the Justice Department
by the EPA in connection with the tragedy.141
133 See Ryan Knutson, Blast at BP Texas Refinery in ’05 Foreshadowed Gulf Disaster,
PROPUBLICA (July 2, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/blast-at-bp-texas-refinery
-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster.
134 See Lustgarten, supra note 5 (“BP considered switching them out [the blow-down
drum] in 2002 but held off because of the $150,000 cost. ‘Capital expenditure is very
tight,’ said an internal BP e-mail from management about the decision at the time. ‘Bank
$150k in savings now.’”).
135 See BAKER SAFETY REVIEW PANEL, THE REPORT OF THE B.P. U.S. REFINERIES
INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW PANEL (2007), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp
_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdfs/Baker
_panel_report.pdf.
136 See id. at 110, 117, 122.
137 U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 2, at 18.
138 James Doran, BP Settles Texas Blast Lawsuits with an Apology, THE TIMES (UK)
(Nov. 10, 2006), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article631960.ece.
139 See BP Penalized $50.6 Million for Texas City Refinery Explosion, ENV’T NEWS SERV.
(Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2010/2010-08-12-091.html (reporting
on both the first, $21 million, and second $50.6 million penalties).
140 See id.
141 See Hiaasen, supra note 120.
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Then, in July 2005, Hurricane Dennis blew through the Gulf of
Mexico.142 In its wake, BP’s $5 billion Thunder Horse production platform
tilted at an alarming twenty-degree angle towards the sea because a valve
designed to stabilize the huge facility was installed backwards.143 The plat-
form was righted at a cost of $250 million and now produces oil; however,
it was plagued by construction problems, including “a welding job so shoddy
that it left underwater pipelines brittle and full of cracks.”144
On March 2, 2006, a BP pipeline ruptured, releasing 267,000 gallons
of oil, the largest spill ever on Alaska’s North Slope.145 This incident oc-
curred after the company once again hired a panel of independent investi-
gators to evaluate employee concerns that it was failing to maintain and
inspect the pipeline and had falsified inspection reports.146 That panel’s
report criticized the unacceptable maintenance backlogs that had devel-
oped as BP tried to sustain profits despite declining production levels on
the North Slope.147 In the aftermath of the spill, the EPA settled a crimi-
nal Clean Water Act case with the company.148 When the agreement was
announced, the Wall Street Journal opined, “The settlements call for extra-
ordinary future supervision over the energy giant that is almost certain
to curb its risk-taking and could require it to go the extra mile on reforms
and undergo extra expense to satisfy government officials.”149 The article
142 See Jack Beven, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT—HURRICANE
DENNIS: 4–13 JULY 2005, 1 (2006), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL042005_Dennis.pdf.
143 See Kristen Hays, Thunder Horse Platform Payoff a Long Time Coming for BP,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 17, 2007), http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Thunder
-Horse-platform-a-long-time-coming-1803712.php (“Befitting its name, BP’s massive
Thunder Horse offshore platform has been beset by dark clouds ever since it was on the
drawing board . . . . [T]he company set out to build the biggest, boldest floating oil and
gas production facility in the world, at a development cost of $5 billion.”); Lyall et al.,
supra note 4 (“Towering 15 stories above the water’s surface, Thunder Horse was meant
to be the company’s crowning glory, the embodiment of its bold gamble to outpace its com-
petitors in finding and exploiting the vast reserves of oil beneath the waters of the gulf.”).
144 Lyall et al., supra note 4.
145 See id. (“It was the worst spill ever on the North Slope, and once again, the cause was pre-
ventable. Investigators found widespread corrosion in several miles of under-maintained
and poorly inspected pipes. BP eventually paid $20 million in fines and restitution.”).
146 See Lustgarten & Knutson, supra note 122.
147 See id.
148 See Richard Mauer & Anna M. Tinsley, Gulf Oil Spill: BP Has a Long Record of Legal
Ethical Violations, MCCLATCHEY NEWS SERV.,(May 8, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com
/2010/05/08/93779/bp-has-a-long-record-of-legal.html.
149 Ann Davis et al., BP Settles Charges, Submits to Watchdogs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2007,
at A3. The company persuaded the government to bundle settlements of charges with
respect to the Alaska spill, the Texas City refinery explosion, and manipulation of propane
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reported that the EPA was still considering a government-wide debar-
ment case.150 According to now-retired EPA debarment attorney Jeanne
Pascal, the holdup was the Pentagon, which informed the EPA that BP
was providing fuel essential to military campaigns in the Middle East.151
Despite the tough terms of the settlement and the seriousness of
a criminal plea, BP once again failed to take the matter seriously. In
November 2010, Mary Frances Barnes, a federal probation officer assigned
to the Alaska case, petitioned a federal district court to revoke the com-
pany’s probation, because its Lisburne facility on Alaska’s North Slope had
spilled 46,000 gallons of oil a year earlier.152 BP is fighting the petition.153
Reporting by the Public Broadcasting System’s Frontline program
and the non-profit investigative journalism organization ProPublica at-
tributes all of these incidents to frantic growth, as John Browne, the cor-
poration’s Chief Executive Officer, and his top executives raced to make
BP the largest oil company in the world.154 BP swallowed American com-
petitors like Amoco and Atlantic Richfield (“ARCO”), neglecting crucial
steps like integrating safety and compliance regimes.155 It pushed the
envelope of technology in its search for oil in the Alaska wilderness and
the deepest waters of the Gulf of Mexico.156 The company struck bold but
extraordinarily risky business deals for development in unstable countries
like Angola and Azerbaijan.157 As top managers in London eyed the accu-
mulation of burdensome debt that accompanies breakneck acquisitions,
they felt irresistible pressure to cut costs with ruthless intensity.158 Tony
Hayward, who replaced Browne, admitted in a speech to Stanford busi-
ness students in 2007, “We diagnosed . . . a company that was too top down,
prices, apparently to “remove a cloud of uncertainty” over its newly appointed CEO, Tony
Hayward, “who took over an energy leader distracted by scandal and lawsuits.” Id.
150 See id.
151 See R. Jeffrey Smith, BP has Steady Sales at Defense Department Despite U.S.
Scrutiny, WASH. POST, July 5, 2010, at A1.
152 See Leopold, supra note 6.
153 See id.




157 See Supplying Gas to Meet the Needs of Regional Consumers, BP CASPIAN, http://www
.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9006670&contentId=7015095 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2011); BP in Angola, BP WORLDWIDE, http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do
?categoryId=427&contentId=2000571 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
158 See Frontline: The Spill, supra note 154.
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too directive, and not good at listening.”159 He promised big changes, includ-
ing a focus on safety “like a laser.”160 In the aftermath of the Gulf spill, he
too was replaced by an American, Robert Dudley, who had headed its oil
spill response effort.161
At the time of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP and its con-
tractors, Transocean and Halliburton, were attempting to accomplish the
“temporary abandonment” of the Macondo well so that the drilling rig
could be hauled by boat to its next job.162 BP would then erect its own
permanent production platform over the well.163 Drilling an oil well in
deep water—the Macondo well was some 18,000 feet below sea level—is
an extremely hazardous process, because pressure within rock formations
that hold the petroleum is very high, requiring counter-pressure from the
drilling rig to avoid the “blowout” of gases out of the well, up the hole,
and into the drilling rig.164 The temporary closure of the well required a
series of challenging and difficult steps that would stabilize the casing
that shored up the long column through which the drilling equipment had
penetrated, fill the mouth of the well with drilling cement, and slowly
withdraw the drilling equipment.165
The specific circumstances leading up to the Deepwater Horizon
spill once again reveal relentless cost-cutting to the detriment of safety,
but with even more catastrophic results. For example, four days before
methane surged into the well, causing the explosion that released an
estimated 205 million gallons of oil into the Gulf, BP employees rejected a
recommendation by employees of its contractor Halliburton that twenty-
one centralizers be installed to secure the well against explosive gases.166
“It will take ten hours to install them,” a BP official said in an internal
email.167 “I do not like this.”168 The blue-ribbon Commission appointed by
President Obama prepared an exhaustive report on the mistakes that
159 Lustgarten, supra note 5.
160 Peter Elkind & David Whitford, BP: ‘An Accident Waiting to Happen,’ FORTUNE BLOG
ON CNN MONEY (Jan. 24, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/01
/24/bp-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/.
161 See Stanley Reed & Brian Swint, BP Board Backs Plan to Replace Hayward with
Dudley, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2010, 8:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07
-25/bp-said-preparing-to-replace-hayward-with-dudley-as-board-seeks-recovery.html.
162 See Gulf Oil Spill Commission Report, supra note 7, at 4.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 90–96.
165 See id. at 90–127 (describing this process).
166 See Knutson, supra note 133.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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occurred during the week prior to the spill, documenting in meticulous
detail how BP and its contractors, Transocean and Halliburton, worked
with such haste to finish the drilling job that their errors multiplied,
making the spill inevitable as well as uncontrollable.169 Of the nine key
mistakes it identified as central causes of the accident, seven were attrib-
utable to bad decisionmaking by BP.170
The Commission did not lay responsibility for the explosion solely
at BP’s doorstep, instead concluding that it was the product of “systemic”
problems within the oil industry as a whole that “place in doubt the safety
culture of the entire industry.”171 We understand this conclusion and have
little sympathy with the oil industry’s effort to turn BP into the solitary
scapegoat for the spill.172 Yet in the context of its shameful track record,
BP’s behavior in the Gulf underscores the very serious problems that
infect its management, as Tony Hayward admitted, from the top down.
On November 2, 2010, BP estimated that its costs from the Gulf
of Mexico spill would total $40 billion.173 To put this large figure in
perspective, BP earned $25 billion in profits in 2008.174 And in 2009, the
total budget for agencies that protect health, worker and consumer safety,
and the environment was approximately $10.3 billion.175 By February 1,
2011, the company announced that its economic condition was sufficiently
stable that it would resume paying dividends to its shareholders.176 It also
said that it would sell half its refining capacity in the United States while
169 See GULF OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at vii–viii.
170 See id. at 125.
171 Id. at vii.
172 See, e.g., Broder, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
173 See Graeme Wearden, BP Oil Spill Costs to Hit $40bn: Company Increases Estimate
from the Deepwater Horizon Explosion by $7.7bn, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Nov. 2, 2010), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/nov/02/bp-oil-spill-costs-40-billion-dollars.
174 See BP, ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 1 (2008), available at http://www.bp.com
/liveassets/bp_internet/annual_review/annual_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets
/downloads_pdfs/BP_annual_report_accounts_2008.pdf (noting a “replacement cost profit”
of $25,593 million).
175 See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3–5 (2010) (the agencies included in this figure
are the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Food and
Drug Administration, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and Occupational
Safety and Health Administration).
176 See Julia Werdiger, BP to Pay First Dividend Since Gulf of Mexico Spill, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/business/global/02bp.html.
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expanding in “faster-growing economies” such as Brazil, Libya, and Jordan,
where regulation is far less rigorous.177
B. BP and the Public Interest
BP is the fourth largest company in the world and the third largest
oil company.178 It is also the largest oil and gas producer operating in the
United States and the sixty-fifth largest contractor supplying goods or
services to the nation.179 The process of debarring such a large company
on a government-wide basis is both complicated and arduous. Not only
must all the legal requirements be fulfilled, relevant agencies and depart-
ments must find another supplier, a task that becomes more difficult in
direct proportion to the increasing size of the contractor and dollar value
of the contracts at issue. Those realities acknowledged, the idea that a com-
pany is simply too big to debar conflicts with both the letter and the spirit
of the law.
Debarment law sets up a ledger with two columns, instructing
federal procurement officials to balance information on both sides against
each other: namely, the impact of debarment on the contractor, including
its work force, against the interests of the public.180 Entries may require
counterintuitive placement. For example, if BP truly is providing the bulk
of the fuel used in Middle Eastern military operations, DOD’s strong in-
terest in continuing a stable supply by rights belongs on the “no debarment/
pro-company” side of the ledger. Of course, this factor cannot be taken too
177 See id.
178 See Global 500, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011
/snapshots/6327.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). But see The Global 2000, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/18/global-2000-10_The-Global-2000_Rank.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011) (using a different methodology to rank BP the tenth largest
corporation worldwide).
179 See BP p.l.c.—Company Description, HOOVER’S, http://www.hoovers.com/company/BP_plc
/hxxkti-1.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (“BP is also BO (Big Oil). It is the world’s third-
largest integrated oil concern, behind Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell. BP explores for
oil and gas in 30 countries and has proved reserves of 18.1 billion barrels of oil equivalent.
BP is the largest oil and gas producer in the US and also a top refiner, with stakes in 16
refineries, processing 4 million barrels of crude oil per day. BP markets its products in more
than 80 countries and operates 22,400 gas stations worldwide. The company’s reputation
took a major hit in 2010 when one of its deepwater rigs, working less than 50 miles south
of Louisiana, exploded and killed 11 workers. Millions of gallons of crude gushed into the
Gulf of Mexico for months.”); see also Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, PROJ. ON
GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
180 See MANUEL, supra note 38, at 8–9 & n.45.
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far. If the balancing test means that the procuring department can block
suspension or debarment merely by asserting the inconvenience of finding
another contractor, the public interest in preventing transactions with
irresponsible contractors would be a null set.
Historically, debarment practice has been preoccupied with financial
fraud (so-called “integrity offenses”).181 Companies that cheat the govern-
ment by padding their bills, asserting unforeseen and disproportionate
cost overruns, delivering shoddy goods and services, or misrepresenting
their qualifications are more likely candidates for exclusion.182 On the other
hand, companies with poor track records regarding worker safety and
labor law compliance have largely escaped exclusion.183
No logic can explain this discrepancy, as the BP example well
illustrates. The theory behind integrity offenses is that cheating exempli-
fies the poor character of a corporation’s leadership and is likely to recur.
Corporate indifference to safe operations, demonstrated repeatedly in
multiple contexts over a period of close to two decades, is no less deeply
ingrained. The government certainly cannot tolerate being defrauded.
Nor can it afford to run the risk that supplies will be disrupted as a
direct and foreseeable result of a contractor’s negligence.
We acknowledge that company-wide debarment might not be ap-
propriate if BP’s corporate structure is composed of discrete entities that
are involved in different kinds of business and operate independently of
the conglomerate’s London headquarters.184 The United States could jus-
tify continuing to do business with such self-governing entities if they
could demonstrate that the root causes of BP’s chronic violations and reck-
less behavior over the last decade, including the events leading up to the
Gulf spill, have little relevance to their performance. Similarly, if the fias-
cos that afflicted BP had external causes—bad weather, political upheaval
in the developing world, or even the stock market crash—the corporation
might argue that its troubled history has little bearing on its ability to
serve as a reliable contractor.
181 See id. at 5, 15 (explaining that contractor misconduct, such as failing to pay taxes and
bribing foreign officials, has caught congressional interest in debarment and suspension).
182 See id.
183 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1033, FEDERAL CONTRACTING:
ASSESSMENTS AND CITATIONS OF FEDERAL LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS BY SELECTED FEDERAL
CONTRACTORS, “Highlights” & 8 (2010) (stating that the federal government awarded $6
billion to fifteen federal contractors that were cited for violating federal labor laws in 2009).
184 See MANUEL, supra note 38, at 9 (explaining the grounds for partial debarment of a
company that participated in wrongdoing).
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Considering these factors, the case in favor of BP’s debarment is
quite strong. BP’s extensive global operations were tightly controlled by
London headquarters,185 with top executives on a relentless cost-cutting
campaign186 that neglected essential maintenance, punished employees
for reporting problems, disregarded rudimentary safety rules, and created
situations where the physical plant—including equipment involved in
highly hazardous operations—was run to failure.187 Each of these epi-
sodes involved oil production, refining, and storage—the same activities
involved in its contracts with the Pentagon.188 The worst catastrophes
killed people, cost large amounts of money, provoked civil and criminal
charges, and the entry of rigorous consent decrees.189 They involved ruin-
ous public relations and repeated apologies from top executives, motivating
BP to take the unusual step of convening high-profile panels of outside
experts to make recommendations on how to remediate the underlying
causes of the problems.190 BP ignored their recommendations and, even
after the Gulf spill, was still a recidivist violator.
The billions of dollars the company spent on the Gulf spill may have
convinced it to mend its ways. Considering how quickly it was able to re-
turn to paying dividends, whether this motivation held when others failed
is far from clear. Its stock price fell to a low of $27.02 on June 25, 2010,
and had rebounded to $44.68 (up 165%) by April 2011.191 But it was trad-
ing at $59.52 on the eve of the accident.192
As of August 2011, the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) (Byron Grote)
and General Counsel (Rupert Bondy) are the same as before the spill.193
185 See GULF OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 45.
186 See Knutson, supra note 133 (“BP demanded a 25 percent budget cut across all its
U.S. operations.”).
187 See id. (“units are to continue running no matter what”); GULF OIL SPILL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 7, at 217–24; Telos Grp., supra note 3, at 17 (“Units are 90% of the
time run to failure . . . .”).
188 See Nick Turse, Punishing BP with Half Measures, CBS NEWS (June 20, 2010), http://
www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-6598856.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody (“As an
institution, the Pentagon runs on oil. . . . [It is] particularly heavily dependent on oil
services, energy, and petroleum companies [such as BP].”).
189 See GULF OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 217–25.
190 See Lustgarten & Knutson, supra note 122.




193 Compare Executive Management, BP, http://www.bp.com/managedlistingsection.do
?categoryId=9021627&contentId=7040960 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011), with BP, ANNUAL
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Six of eight board members are also the same.194 The most notable
change was the elevation of Mark Bly, a twenty-eight-year BP veteran
with an engineering background, to Executive Vice President for Safety &
Operational Risk.195 Until 2007, Bly had worked on a series of “engineering
and commercial leadership assignments” and “Business Unit Leader posts,”
when he was promoted to “Group Vice President” for exploration and
production.196 In 2008, he became “Group Head of Safety & Operations.”197
He is the first occupant of the “executive team” position devoted to safety
and was promoted in October 2010.198 Given his lengthy tenure with the
company and his scant experience with safety programs, Bly has his
work cut out for him. His first important assignment was to write the Bly
Report,199 an internal audit intended to discover the causes of the Gulf
spill. The first two paragraphs of the press release on the report read:
No single factor caused the Macondo well tragedy. Rather,
a sequence of failures involving a number of different
parties led to the explosion and fire which killed 11 people
and caused widespread pollution in the Gulf of Mexico
earlier this year.
A report released by BP today concludes that decisions
made by “multiple companies and work teams” contributed
to the accident which it says arose from “a complex and
interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments,
engineering design, operational implementation and team
interfaces.”200
REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 2009 66 (2009), available at http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet
/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/STAGING/common_assets/downloads
/pdf/BP_Annual_Report_and_Accounts_2009.pdf.
194 Compare The Board, BP, http://www.bp.com/managedlistingsection.do?categoryId=
9021626&contentId=7041219 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) with BP, ANNUAL REPORTS AND
ACCOUNTS 2009, supra note 193, at 66.
195 See Biography of Mark Bly, BP, http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId




199 BP, DEEPWATER ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT (2010), http://www.bp.com/liveassets
/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads
_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf [hereinafter BLY REPORT].
200 Press Release, BP, BP Releases Report on Causes of Gulf of Mexico Tragedy (Sept. 8,
2010), available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=
7064893.
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The report was greeted with appropriate cynicism by press covering
the story:
BP on Wednesday laid out its most detailed analysis yet
on possible causes of the Deepwater Horizon accident in
April, taking particular aim at mistakes by contractors on
the doomed rig while claiming only a limited role in the
disaster. . . . Though BP personnel are directly implicated
in just one of the eight factors [identified in the report],
company investigators stressed the report was not intended
to be the final word on the subject, nor an accounting of
legal responsibility. “Our purpose was not to apportion
blame or liability but rather to learn, recommend areas for
improvement and share lessons with others,” said Mark
Bly, the BP safety chief who led the investigation.201
The decision to have its newly elevated, but inexperienced safety
chief focus his energies first and foremost on a report shifting blame for
the Gulf spill onto other parties does not provide much assurance that
BP has finally accepted the need to infuse a safety culture from top to
bottom and bottom to top. Given these peculiar priorities, Bly’s limited
background in risk management, and the stability of company leadership
before and after the spill—especially in the key categories of CFO and
general counsel—any claim that safety has become BP’s top priority does
not seem to us to be as compelling an indication of its future direction as
its dreadful, recidivist history.
Because debarment is automatic under the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, the EPA is one of the few agencies with a full-time debarment
staff.202 An EPA attorney has chaired the Interagency Suspension and
Debarment Committee,203 a group tasked with coordinating the debarment
201 See, e.g., Brett Clanton & Jennifer Dlouhy, BP Spreads Blame for Deadly Blowout,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/energy
/7192813.html.
202 As of 2005, the EPA had twelve professional staff members; the GSA had two pro-
fessional staff members and one support staff member; the DLA had one professional
staff member; the Air Force had three professional staff members and Co-op students
providing support; the Army had six professional staff members and one support staff
member; and the Navy had three professional staff members and one support staff
member. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 28.
203 See INTERAGENCY SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT COMM., http://www.epa.gov/isdc/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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and suspension actions across federal agencies, for many years.204
Consistent with this investment in the debarment process, EPA attor-
neys were working on the debarment of BP for many years prior to the
Gulf spill.205 Nevertheless, relative to the DOD, the agency controls a small
share of total federal contracting dollars and must depend on its sister
agencies and departments for maximum impact on the debarred firm.
Although the reasoning underlying its resistance to debarring BP
may not have been articulated very clearly, as a legal matter, if the EPA
initiated debarment procedures and the DOD wanted to maintain BP as
its primary fuel supplier, either a waiver must be granted or an adminis-
trative agreement signed.206 Again, agencies or departments are allowed
to grant waivers for compelling reasons, including, in the DOD’s case, the
imperatives of effective national defense,207 and it is likely that the DOD
made some variation on this argument when it informed EPA that it
would not cooperate in the debarment of BP.208
The nub of this claim would be whether military units deployed in
Iraq and Afghanistan could obtain alternative fuel supplies without dis-
ruption and for a reasonable price. Few people on the outside of govern-
ment are able to gauge the viability of this alternative. The oil industry is
oligopolistic in the sense that it is dominated by a few very large firms, yet
competition still exists, and the size of the purchase—some $2.2 billion in
jet and other fuel—would probably make it an attractive bidding target.209
In the end, we suspect that something other than an evaluation
on the merits is at the root of the Pentagon’s reluctance to cooperate in the
EPA’s efforts to debar BP. At best, the military suffers from chronic inertia
towards its largest contractors and, at worst, its contracting function is
captured by those firms.
204 See Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Members, INTERAGENCY
SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT COMM. (Nov. 16, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/2004111
6101817/http://www.epa.gov/isdc/member.htm (accessed by searching for Interagency
Suspension and Debarment Committee in the Internet Archive index).
205 See Lustgarten & Knutson, supra note 122.
206 See 48 C.F.R. § 209.405 (2011).
207 See 48 C.F.R. § 209.405(a)(iv) (2011).
208 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
209 See Journal Community Discussion: Should BP Be Barred from Future Federal Contract
or U.S. Oil Leases After Gulf Spill?, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/community/groups
/question-day-229/topics/should-british-petroleum-barred-future (last visited Oct. 31, 2011)
(online poll indicating fifty-eight percent of readers believe BP should be barred).
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III. A BROKEN SYSTEM
A. Too Big to Debar?
In fiscal year 2010, the United States government spent an esti-
mated $535.3 billion, making it the largest buyer of goods and services
in the world by many orders of magnitude.210 In a system so vast, it per-
haps should not surprise us that debarments and suspensions do not occur
with the frequency or in the circumstances that the law clearly intends.
How could any human effort to dispense such unimaginably huge amounts
of money avoid allowing irresponsible companies to continue to do busi-
ness with the government?
But critical evaluations of the system indicate not just that it has
flaws, but that it is largely dysfunctional. In an uncomfortable analogy
to the Federal Reserve’s attitude toward the investment banks that were
caught in the crosshairs of the 2008 economic meltdown,211 the DOD has
persuaded itself that its major contractors are simply too big to debar.
The difference is that no imminent crisis justifies this attitude. And, while
the most important suppliers are part of highly concentrated industries,
as illustrated by BP’s situation, it is far from clear that debarring them
would cause significant disruptions of military operations around the
world.212 The simple fact is that the DOD does not appear to make any
real effort to pursue exclusions against its largest suppliers, establishing
the vicious cycle that those remedies are nothing to fear.
A number of large corporations with long records of misconduct
have escaped debarment. A 2002 POGO study found that sixteen of the
top forty-three companies with the most federal contracts had twenty-
eight criminal convictions since 1990 and had paid close to $3.4 billion
in fines (BP did not make the list).213 Of these forty-three companies, the
210 See MANUEL, supra note 38, at 15.
211 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System, Statement Before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2 (Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100902a.pdf (the problem of “[t]oo-big-to-fail
financial institutions”).
212 In 2010, BP’s contracts with DOD for fuel were worth $1.03 billion. See USASPENDING,
http://www.usaspending.gov (perform filtered search for Major Agency—“Department of
Defense”; Product/Service Subcategory—“Liquid Propellants and Fuels”; Type of Spending—
“Contracts”; Recipient—“BP P.L.C.”; and Fiscal Year—“2010”) (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
Royal Dutch Shell came in a close second at $1.01 billion. See id. (change recipient filter
to “Royal Dutch”).
213 See Federal Contractor Misconduct, supra note 15, at “Executive Summary” (including
administrative, civil, and criminal violations and allegations of violations, as well as
Superfund settlements, in the total amount of fines).
112 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:81
government only suspended or debarred one, and then only for five days.214
First on POGO’s Top-Ten Repeat Offenders list was General Electric
(“GE”), which had sixty-three instances of misconduct or alleged mis-
conduct resulting in approximately $982.9 million in fines, restitution,
settlements, and Superfund cleanup costs between 1990 and 2002.215
Since 1992, contractors have only increased in size and influence,
with high-profile mergers of numerous defense companies including
Lockheed and Martin Marietta, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, Northrop
and Grumman, and Honeywell and Allied Signal.216 BP itself has grown
enormously over the past decade, merging with oil companies Amoco and
ARCO in 1998 and 2000, respectively.217
Clearly, large companies are better equipped to avoid exclusions
because they can afford well-paid attorneys who mount expensive and
time-consuming challenges to suspensions and debarments and are able
to frame settlement terms that avoid application of the ultimate remedy.218
However, an imbalance between private party and government resources
does not account for the entire phenomenon. Some large contractors are
perceived as so indispensable to the government that suspending or debar-
ring them is nearly impossible.219 For example, although the Air Force sus-
pended Boeing in 2003, it awarded the company two additional contracts
214 See id. (compiling a list of convictions and fines for the top forty-three contractors and
describing how, between 1990 and 2002, the government had only suspended one com-
pany for five days after having pled guilty to diverting money from the U.S. Foreign
Military Aid Program).
215 See Federal Contractor Misconduct, supra note 15, at “Repeat Offenders.” The remain-
ing nine on POGO’s top-ten repeat offenders list are: Lockheed Martin with sixty-three
instances of misconduct or alleged misconduct and $231,872,404 in payments; Boeing,
thirty-six and $357,973,000; Raytheon, twenty-four and $128,652,919; Northrop Grumman,
twenty-one and $87,876,581; Fluor, nineteen and $70,016,614; United Technologies, eighteen
and $214,836,860; TRW, sixteen and $389,484,000; AT&T, fourteen and $16,090,000; and
Unisys, twelve and $182,245,692 in payments. See id.
216 See Federal Contractor Misconduct, supra note 15, at “Uneven Playing Field;” see also
Jennifer S. Zucker, The Boeing Suspension: Has Increased Consolidation Tied the
Department of Defense’s Hands?, ARMY LAW. (Apr. 2004) 14, 26, available at http://www
.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/04-2004.pdf (demonstrating the reduction in the defense
market between 1990 and 1998).
217 See Chronology—Big Oil’s Years of Merger Mania, REUTERS (July 14, 2011), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-conocophillips-mergers-idUSTRE76D56V20110714.
218 See Federal Contractor Misconduct, supra note 15, at “Uneven Playing Field”; Seth
Morris, The Dormant Power of the Purse: The Failure of the Government to Use Its
Purchasing Power to Promote to Promote Corporate Compliance with the Law,
MULTINAT’L MONITOR (July/Aug. 2002), http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002
/072002/morris.html.
219 See Federal Contractor Misconduct, supra note 15, at “Uneven Playing Field.”
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that same year, explaining that it was the “only launch provider that can
currently meet the requirements of this mission.”220 The dependence on
large contractors is not new. In 1985, the Air Force, the Navy, and NASA
pursued dozens of contracts with GE despite its ineligibility because the
company “was the sole qualified source” to perform the work.221
B. Lax Settlements
In the examples above, DOD continued to contract with GE and
other large companies by granting “compelling reasons” waivers. Because
the FAR does not define the term, agencies such as the DOD have crafted
open-ended definitions that cover nearly any situation. For example, DOD
regulations allow waivers when “urgency” or “national defense” require
it.222 Most statutory debarment provisions stand in stark contrast to the
FAR’s nonspecific waiver provisions.223 Under the CWA and CAA, for
example, only the President can waive an exclusion if he or she deter-
mines it is in the country’s paramount interest and notifies Congress.224
As the BP case demonstrates, it is impossible to tell what influ-
ence these open-ended waiver authorities have on the debarment process.
220 Renae Merle, Boeing Wins Contract Despite Suspension, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at E3.
221 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/NSAID-87-37BR, PROCUREMENT: SUSPENSION
AND DEBARMENT PROCEDURES 53 (1987). The Navy granted GE a compelling reason waiver
within a month of its suspension. See id. at 55. The Air Force suspended GE for nearly
five and a half months but narrowed the scope of the suspension twice, first limiting it
to GE’s Space Systems Division and then only to the Re-entry Systems Operation. See id.
at 53. The Defense Department’s reluctance to pursue suspension and debarment of its
top contractors is perhaps best exemplified by the department’s approach to GE. Morris,
supra note 218. (“A few years after GE’s five month suspension, the Defense Department
established an office specifically to handle GE violations because the Pentagon believed
General Electric was violating laws at such a high rate. At the request of the Department
of Defense Inspector General, the Philadelphia Remedies Unit was established within the
Defense Contract Management Agency’s Mid-Atlantic District on June 1, 1990. . . .
Regarding suspension and debarment, the Unit’s report states: ‘None of the recommen-
dations made for action against a corporate entity of the General Electric Company were
approved by the debarring officials at DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] or the Army who
reviewed these recommendations. In the only matter involving a GE entity which re-
sulted in administrative action, the DLA debarring official issued a suspension against
the Aircraft Engine Group and lifted it five days later. The result of these efforts make
it fairly clear that, at least in the case of the General Electric Company and probably
other major contractors, administrative action is not a threatening remedy.’”).
222 See 48 C.F.R. §§ 209.405(a)(ii), (iv) (2011).
223 See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
224 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368(d) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606(d)
(2006).
114 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:81
According to press accounts, EPA debarment attorneys have tried for years
to persuade the DOD to consider debarring BP, but have been spurned
by their military counterparts behind the scenes.225 Yet Jeanne Pascal,
the lead EPA debarment attorney on the BP case, only spoke openly about
her experiences following her retirement from government service and
in the aftermath of the explosion that caused the eighty-seven-day Gulf
spill.226 This case study and POGO’s research227 indicate that the possibil-
ity of a waiver is routinely invoked, directly or by implication, behind the
scenes, and is enough to stifle follow-through on debarment cases.228 True,
debarment under the CWA and CAA are automatic, but these actions are
limited to the facilities involved in the specific violations and have much
less impact than a company-wide exclusion would.
According to GAO’s research, in the minority of cases where the
DOD decides to pursue debarment, administrative agreements are the pre-
ferred alternative, despite the ready availability of waivers.229 In 2004, six
agencies—the Air Force, Army, Navy, Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”),
GSA, and EPA—proposed debarment in 651 cases, achieved it in 590 cases,
and entered into a total of thirty-eight administrative agreements.230 Out
of those six agencies, only two—the Air Force and Army—issued a total
of five compelling reasons waivers that same year.231
Administrative agreements require errant contractors to take a
series of remedial steps, such as appointing an ombudsman, to ensure their
compliance with the law and are meant to improve contractor responsi-
bility without diminishing competition by removing the contractor from
the business landscape.232 Yet, there is reason to doubt that these agree-
ments foster ethical behavior. For example, in 1995, Lockheed Corporation
pled guilty to bribing an Egyptian official.233 In addition to paying a $24.8
million fine, it also entered an administrative agreement with the Air
225 See Lustgarten, supra note 5.
226 See id.
227 See Testimony of POGO’s Scott Amey on “Federal Contracting: Why Do Risky Contractors
Keep Getting Rewarded With Taxpayer Dollars?,” PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (July 18,
2007), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/testimony/contract-oversight/co-fcm-20070718.html.
228 See id.
229 See FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 12–13.
230 See id. at 12 tbl.2.
231 See id. at 13.
232 See id. at 13 tbl.3.
233 See Scott Doggett & Annette Haddad, Commercial Bribery Under Attack, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2000, at C2 (explaining that the case was one of the world’s “biggest bribery
cases” and “led to Lockheed Corp. paying a record $24.8 million in penalties in 1995 for
illegally bribing an Egyptian official to win an aircraft contract”).
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Force.234 Since implementing the agreement, Lockheed Martin and its
subsidiaries have been accused of at least eight violations—related to
procurement fraud, environmental pollution, employment discrimination,
shareholder fraud, nuclear safety violations and violations of the Arms
Export Control Act—and have paid approximately $590.1 million in fines/
penalties and settlements.235
The best solution to the potential misuse of broad waiver author-
ity and lax administrative agreements is to require comprehensive self-
reporting by government contractors to a centralized database. As we
explain further in the next section, some reporting requirements exist,
but they are so limited that BP would not have been required to report
any of the escalating series of civil and criminal violations described here.
C. Incomplete and Incorrect Data
Until recently, data on administrative agreements and compelling
reason waivers was not shared among agencies or recorded in the Excluded
Parties List System (“EPLS”), which is the central database used by federal
officials tasked with assessing a potential contractor’s eligibility.236 In 1994,
agencies began collecting past performance data on contractors,237 but they
maintained their own separate and unconnected systems until 2002.238
Even after the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (“PPIRS”)
was created, contracting officials were suspicious of its relevance and reli-
ability and routinely ignored it.239 In 2009, the FAR was amended to man-
date that all federal agencies post contractor performance evaluations in
234 Plea Agreement, United States v. Lockheed Corp., No. 1:94-CR-226-01 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1,
1995), available at http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/38/cases/245/1333
/lockheed-martin-egypt_plea.pdf (last accessed Oct. 31, 2011).
235 See Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, supra note 179 (ranked number one in
the misconduct database).
236 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.404 (2010).
237 See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355 § 1091, 108
Stat. 3242, 3272 (1994).
238 See Memorandum from Angela B. Styles, Adm’r, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Agency
Senior Procurement Executives (July 3, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse
.archives.gov/omb/procurement/contract_perf/past_perf_070302.pdf. Prior to 2002, the
Defense Department alone managed three different systems. See Performance Information
Report, supra note 15, at 7 (2009) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE INFORMATION REPORT].
239 See PERFORMANCE INFORMATION REPORT, supra note 15, at 8–9. The 2009 GAO report
found that for the contracts that required a performance assessment in 2007, past per-
formance evaluations were done on less than one third. See id. at 11–12.
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PPIRS and to require that contracting officers consult the database before
awarding contracts of $150,000 or more.240
In further response to persistent concerns about the inadequacy of
contractor databases, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization
Act of 2009 establishes the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity
Information System (“FAPIIS”).241 FAPIIS is a link providing access to
EPLS and PPIRS. It also includes “contracting officers’ non-responsibility
determinations (i.e., agency assessments that prospective contractors do not
meet requisite responsibility standards to perform for the government),”
as well as “contract terminations for default or cause, agency defective
pricing determinations,” administrative agreements written in lieu of
outright exclusion, and, most importantly, “contractor self-reporting of
criminal convictions,” adjudicated or settled instances of “civil liability,”
and “adverse administrative actions.”242 The public can access the
FAPIIS public site, which contains everything but contracting officers’
non-responsibility determinations.243
While theoretically a significant improvement over EPLS and
PPIRS, government watchdogs have strongly criticized the scope and
implementation of FAPIIS.244 One notable limitation is that it only
contains misconduct committed in direct connection to federal or state
contracts or grants, and even then only “if the misconduct resulted in a
conviction or a finding of fault.”245 Thus, BP would not be listed for the
240 See 48 C.F.R. § 42.1502-03 (2010); see also Contractor Performance Information, 74 Fed.
Reg. 31,557 (July 1, 2009). As of July 1, 2009, the FAR requires contracting officials to
evaluate past performance information for orders exceeding the simplified acquisition
threshold, generally $150,000. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2010).
241 See Duncan Hunter Defense Authorization Act of 2009, 41 U.S.C. § 2313 (2011).
242 Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,059
(Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter FAPIIS Rule].
243 See Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-212, § 3010, 124 Stat. 2302,
2340 (2010). The public site went live April 14, 2011. See Gary Therkildsen, FAPIIS is
a Steaming Pile, OMB WATCH (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11628.
244 See Tom Lee, FAPIIS May Be the Worst Government Website We’ve Ever Seen, SUNLIGHT
FOUND. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2011, 5:49 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/04/19/fapiis
-may-be-the-worst-government-website-weve-ever-seen/; Therkildsen, supra note 243.
But see Neil Gordon, FAPIIS: An Inauspicious Debut, But Starting to Show Signs of Life,
PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://pogoblog.typepad.com
/pogo/2011/04/fapiis-an-inauspicious-debut-but-starting-to-show-signs-of-life.html.
245 Neil Gordon, Solution: How the Government Can Stop Doing Business With Risky
Contractors, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.truth-out.org/solution-how-government
-can-stop-doing-business-risky-contractors/1299139200.
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2010 oil spill, the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion, or the oil spills on
Alaska’s North Slope.246
The databases also suffer from persistent inaccuracies. Two GAO
reports, one in 2005247 and another in 2009, warned that ineffective man-
agement and control of databases prevented contracting officers from
determining with confidence whether a prospective contractor was sus-
pended, debarred or proposed for debarment.248 In July 2011, the DOD
Inspector General found typographical and user input errors throughout
the database.249
Broader reporting requirements, more stringent quality control,
and better enforcement of the requirement that contracting officers check
FAPIIS prior to awards are critical reforms. Reporting requirements should
apply to every incident when a contractor or its principals are convicted
or plead guilty to federal or state criminal offenses that are cognizable
under debarment statutes and administrative rules, because they could
potentially affect the company’s ability to perform services or provide goods
in a safe, non-fraudulent, and legally compliant manner. Reporting should
also apply to incidents when a company or its principals lose a verdict or
settle any similarly relevant federal or state civil complaint. We realize
that defining the scope and details of such reporting will require signifi-
cant effort by the government and the contracting community, although
technical barriers should be quite low. Only by introducing such trans-
parency into the system can agencies and debarments be made account-
able for implementing the law fairly and consistently.
CONCLUSION
At some point—hopefully sooner rather than later—the nation
must resolve its ambivalence about firms that are supposedly too big to
fail, too big to debar, and, ultimately, too big to obey. A major cause of this
246 Even if the incident happened during the performance of a contract (BP was awarded
over $1 billion in federal contracts in 2010), the incident would also not be reported in
FAPIIS if BP settled out of court “without an admission or finding of guilt or liability.” Id.
247 See FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 14–15.
248 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-174, EXCLUDED PARTIES LIST SYSTEM:
SUSPENDED AND DEBARRED BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IMPROPERLY RECEIVE FEDERAL
FUNDS 4, 17–18 (2009).
249 See INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. D-2011-083, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
CAN FURTHER IMPROVE THE DOD SUPSENSION AND DEBARMENT PROCESS 14 (2011), available
at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy11/11-083.pdf.
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ambivalence is the contradictory positions taken by the far right of the
political spectrum, known loosely as the Tea Party. On one hand, the
movement was inspired in large measure by the government bailout of
the nation’s largest financial institutions.250 Yet those same grassroots
constituencies are also the inspiration for conservative congressional oppo-
sition to implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act on the grounds that government should not interfere with
business.251 Since no one would advocate the chaos that could result in
the absence of either a bailout or financial system reform, hopefully it is
only a matter of time before the nation resolves these contradictions, firmly
rejecting the notion that any corporation is too big to suffer the conse-
quences of its illegal, irresponsible, and destructive actions.
BP’s survival as a government contractor would fatally undermine
the credibility of enforcement of the law across the board, especially in
the arena of protecting public health, worker safety, and natural resources.
Beginning with BP, debarment should become the routine consequence
of corporate misconduct that harms others more than the company itself.
250 See Oren Dorell, Tax Revolt A Recipe for Tea Parties, USA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2009),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-04-12-teaparties12_N.htm.
251 See, e.g., Edward Hyatt, Dodd-Frank Under Fire a Year Later, N.Y. TIMES (July 18,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/business/dodd-frank-under-fire-a-year-later
.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=dodd%20frank%20&st=cse.
